Summer, 1960. John Kennedy has just won the Democratic presidential nomination. It is time to pick a Vice-Presidential candidate. First thing in the morning, on the day after his nomination victory, Kennedy asks Lyndon Johnson to join the ticket. Many of Kennedy’s advisors and supporters don’t just think this choice is unwise, they hate Johnson and see him as a symbol of Southern intolerance and repression. Kennedy’s closest advisor, his brother Robert, despises Johnson and apparently tries to sabotage the selection even after it was already made.
Likewise, some of Johnson’s closest advisors were opposed to him becoming Vice President and Johnson is not even on the radar of most national journalists and pundits. Johnson’s mentor and father figure, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, was adamantly against the idea.
There were many obvious reasons why Johnson seemed like an unlikely VP selection. Johnson’s life long dream was to be President of the United States, that dream had just been snatched from him by Kennedy. The Vice Presidency was then seen as a joke and a massive step backwards for Johnson. In 1960, Johnson was the Senate Majority Leader and the most powerful Democrat in America. Johnson’s control and tactical command of the Senate was virtually absolute.
Feelings against the Johnson’s VP nomination were so strong on both sides that blows were exchanged and lasting personal fractures were created on the day Kennedy offered the job to Johnson. Yet, through vitriolic arguing and cajoling, Kennedy and Johnson were remarkably dedicated to making sure Johnson was nominated as Vice President. Even though most of their trusted voices were telling them not to go forward, and party bosses were threatening to stop the VP nomination of Johnson, the two men reached an agreement in about eight hours, despite enormous pressure.
The events surrounding Kennedy’s VP nomination of Johnson have been examined countless times. In Robert Caro’s most recent book, The Passage of Power, the author does a wonderful factual analysis of that day’s events. Mr. Caro also carefully explains that both Kennedy and Johnson were keenly aware of their own interests and made strategic decisions on that day based upon those interests, irrespective of how unpopular or seemingly mistaken those decisions were.
The forces that motivated Kennedy and Johnson were so strong that each man was able to reach an agreement in the face of violent opposition and accusations of betrayal. The episode forms a powerful lesson for mediators and dispute resolution professionals: understand the parties’ interests. Parties are likely to consent to an agreement which advances those interests to the great possible extent, despite what other’s think or advise.
Why did Kennedy offer Johnson the VP nomination? As Mr. Caro explains, simple math. Kennedy needed to win Texas in order to win the election. Kennedy was not afraid to alienate his Northern supporters by picking Johnson because Kennedy understood fundamentally that Johnson was needed to give him the best chance to beat Nixon in the general election. On a personal level, Kennedy did not particularly like Johnson and did not agree with him on many political issues.
Why did Johnson want the VP nomination? Mr. Caro details that since Johnson wanted to be President more than anything else, Johnson’s realized that, as a Southerner, he might never win the Democratic nomination outright. So, VP was likely the best path to Presidency for him. Also, if Kennedy became President, Mr. Caro points out that Johnson would no longer be the most powerful Democrat and would lose at least some of the power he had amassed as Senate Majority Leader. Lastly, Johnson did not like Kennedy, thought he was an insignificant and undeserving candidate, and hated his brother, Robert. Johnson knew that VP, although seemingly a significant step down, was the best vehicle to advance Johnson’s interests.
So, as Mr. Caro wonderfully describes, in the face of sometimes apoplectic, hateful opposition, an agreement was made. History proved that to be remarkably successful in relation to both parties. Johnson campaigned effectively for Kennedy, delivered Texas, and Kennedy beat Nixon and became President. On November 22, 1963, due to national tragedy, Johnson became President and Johnson won re-election in 1964.
Fundamental interests dictate agreements. Always keep this in mind when negotiating or mediating. Remember the lessons of 1960 when faced with trying to form an unpopular agreement. No matter how loud the opposition, if an agreement genuinely advances the parties’ interests, it should be considered.
Mediation Works 